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The random number generators (RNGs) are an indispensable tool in cryptography. Of various
types of RNG method, those using radiations from nuclear decays (radioactive RNG) has a relatively
long history but their security has never been discussed rigorously in the literature. In this paper we
propose a new method of the radioactive RNG that admits a simple and rigorous proof of security.
The security proof is made possible here by exploiting the parity (space inversion) symmetry arising
in the device, which has previously been unfocused but is generically available for a nuclide which
decays by parity-conserving interactions.
I. INTRODUCTION
In information technology, random number generators
(RNGs) refer in general to devices that output numbers
distributed in a certain range uniformly. If one wishes to
use them for information security purposes in particular,
their outputs must be secret [1], in addition to being uni-
formly distributed. Furthermore, in order for the RNG
to be usable by anyone, these properties need to be guar-
anteed by some objective evidence.
Suppose, for instance, that one buys a dice from a not-
necessarily-reliable vendor and throws it alone in a closed
room. For this process to generate a uniform distribution,
he must be sure with an evidence that the dice is fair. As
for the secrecy, another evidence is necessary to ensure
that the outputs are unpredictable and unknown to out-
side; e.g., even to the vendor or the manufacturer who
had all the chances to tamper with the dice such that the
outputs follow a certain pattern. But how can one find
an objective basis of secrecy that anyone can agree with?
Arguably, the most convincing basis of secrecy would
be the laws of nature, that is, if nature assures the se-
crecy by law, then nothing can be utilized to predict the
outputs. This is precisely what we will adopt when we
ensure the secrecy of our novel RNG proposed in this pa-
per, under a reasonable set of assumptions which can in
practice be verified without much difficulty.
In what follows, if the output of a given RNG is rig-
orously proven to be secret, we call it a secure RNG.
Throughout the paper we focus on secure RNGs. The
formal definition of the security, the so-called universally
composable security [2], will be given in Section IV A; this
is the most strict definition known at the present.
The secure RNG based on the laws of quantum me-
chanics is indeed possible [3–17]. For example, RNGs
using photons have been studied for a long time, and
some of them have been strictly proven to be secure. A
common method of the single photon RNG is to use two
complementary bases +,× of the polarization: The legit-
imate user (henceforth, Alice) generates a single photon
state having a polarization in one basis, say, the vertical
polarization state |l〉 belonging to basis +, and then mea-
sures it in the other, diagonally slanted × basis. Alice
adopts the measurement result as the random bits.
The major concern here is that the vendor of the light
source may be an eavesdropper (henceforth, Eve). In
such a case, Eve could have tampered with the source
to retain correlation with her own device, and may have
access to the random bits as a result.
The security against such eavesdropper can still be ar-
gued as follows. Being a pure state, the initial state |l〉
cannot be entangled with outside, and thus has no cor-
relation with Eve’s device. When the state is measured
in the complementary basis ×, each measurement result,
l or l , occurs exactly with probability one half. Thus
the random bits are distributed uniformly, and they are
uncorrelated with Eve. Unfortunately, the single photon
RNGs have practical disadvantages because the energy of
the photon is minute and, accordingly, the detector must
be highly sensitive. For this reason, the single photon
RNGs suffer constraints for reduction both in their size
and cost.
Besides single photon RNGs, there is another type of
RNG methods which also exploit quantum phenomena,
i.e., those using radiations from nuclear decays [18, 19].
In these radioactive RNG methods one detects radiations
and adopts the timings of the detections as random num-
bers. These methods were already studied half a century
ago [20], and is actually older than the single photon
RNG mentioned above. The advantage of the radioac-
tive RNG is that their device can be made smaller and
simpler than that of single photon RNGs. A sufficient
sensitivity to the radiation can be achieved even with a
small detector, since the energies of radiations are much
larger than those of photons. Indeed, radioactive RNG
chips of a few square millimeters are already manufac-
tured [21, 22].
However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no se-
curity proof of the radioactive RNG, despite that it has
been shown that they can generate a uniform distribu-
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FIG. 1. The device setup for the radioactive random number
generator (radioactive RNG) consists of a radiation source
and a detector. We will denote the detector by D. With
this setup, Alice (the legitimate user) obtains raw data ~i by
executing the procedure, steps (i), (ii) of Section II A.
tion [20]. We find this dissatisfying, even though the
concept of the composable security, which is essential for
the proof, is relatively new [2].
Here we present a new method of the radioactive RNG
which admits a rigorous security proof. The required se-
curity is ensured by the parity (space inversion) symme-
try arising in the device, which is available generically for
a nuclide which decays by parity-conserving interactions.
The device structure is as simple as before, consisting
only of a radiation source and a detector. The only dif-
ference is the two conditions newly imposed on the device
– which are readily realized in practice – which allow us
to make use of the parity symmetry for ensuring security;
see conditions (a) and (b) mentioned below.
The outline of our security proof is as follows. On
one hand, in the actual implementation, we use detec-
tion timings as the origin of randomness. On the other
hand, in the security analysis, we instead analyze the
absence/presence (denoted by zi = 0, 1) of detection in
each time bin i, since they are merely two different for-
mats of the same measurement results (Fig. 3). Then
by temporarily limiting ourselves to an ideal situation
(Section III A and Fig. 4 (B)), we show that variables
zi correspond to measuring the direction, up or down,
of the radiation (Fig. 4 (C)). Hence measuring a parity
symmetric radiation in this setting means measuring a
parity invariant state using a pair of projectors which in-
terchange to each other under parity operation. Then
values zi = 0, 1 occur with an equal probability, and in
addition, the resulting (sub-normalized) states on Eve’s
side remain fixed, irrespective of zi; i.e., Eve can gain no
information of zi by any measurement. The security in
non-ideal situations can also be shown by an essentially
the same argument (Section III B and Fig. 4 (A), (D)).
II. MAIN RESULT
A. RNG method
We consider the following type of the radioactive RNG
method. By using a device consisting of a radiation
source and a detector D (Fig. 1), Alice executes the fol-
lowing procedure (Fig. 2): Alice chooses integer parame-
Randomness extractor 𝑓𝑠
Measurement results  𝑖
(roughly secure string)
Final bits  𝑟
(perfectly secure string)
Bits known to EveBits unknown to Eve
Eve
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known
Completely
unknown
Alice
𝜌 𝐼𝐸
Initial state 𝜌𝐴𝐸 0
Entangled
Radiation source
Measurement
Detector 𝐷
FIG. 2. The purpose of randomness extraction is to extract
from a measurement result ~i, which may be partially known
to Eve, a random bits ~r completely unknown to Eve. In the
above picture, ~i being partially known to Eve is expressed by
its being a mixture of black (unknown) and white (known)
elements. The number of unknown bits equals the smooth
conditional min-entropy Hδmin(~I|E), a function of ρ~IE .
ters N and nfin such that they satisfy 0 ≤ nfin ≤ N . She
also selects a function fs randomly from a predetermined
set of functions F = {fs}, each of which outputs an nfin
bit string. Then she repeats the following steps.
Radioactive RNG: (i) Measurement of decay
timings: Alice measures radiations from the
source, using detector D, in time bins i =
1, . . . , N .
She then records the measurement result as
the list of time bins where a detection oc-
curred; i.e. as ~i = (i1, . . . , indet), with ndet
being the number of detections, and ij being
in the increasing order, 1 ≤ i1 < i2 < · · · <
indet ≤ N . If there was no detection, she lets
~i = (0), i.e., ndet = 1, i1 = 0.
(ii) Randomness extraction: Alice calculates
the final bits ~r = fs(~i) of length nfin.
The purpose of each step is as follows (Fig. 2).
Step (i) generates raw data ~i to be used as the source
of the final bits ~r. For ~r to be secure, not all, but a cer-
tain fraction of ~i need to be unknown to Eve. The stan-
dard theoretical results say that the size of this unknown
fraction equals a quantity called the smooth conditional
min-entropy Hδmin(
~I|E), which is a function of the joint
state ρ~IE of variable
~i and Eve (see Section IV A and Ref.
[23] for the rigorous definitions).
In step (ii) she extracts these Hδmin(
~I|E) bits that are
unknown, and generate ~r, which is completely unknown
to Eve (Section IV A and Ref. [23]).
We denote the width of one time bin by ∆t. In order
to simplify later presentations, without loss of generality,
we assume that in every time bin, Alice starts her mea-
surement at the beginning of the time bin and finishes it
in a finite time ≤ ∆t.
3B. Conditions on the device
Hence the security analysis is reduced to lower bound-
ing Hδmin(
~I|E). We are concerned with the possibility
that the radiation source to be measured in step (i) may
be entangled with Eve, and through that entanglement
Eve may access ~i; i.e., Hδmin(
~I|E) may become too small
to guarantee the security of ~r (cf. 2nd and 7th para-
graphs of Section I). The goal of this paper is to nullify
such eavesdropping strategy by making use of the parity
symmetry.
1. Statement of conditions
To this end, we assume the following three conditions
on the device. The first two of them, (a) and (b), in
particular, are introduced in order to realize the parity
symmetry in the device.
(a) Radiation source: At the beginning of each time
bin (i.e., immediately before Alice’s measurement),
the state of radiations is parity invariant.
(b) Detector: Detector D is housed within one hemi-
sphere around the source (Fig. 4 (A)).
(c) Effect on radiations by measurements: Effect
on radiations in the vicinity of D, caused by Alice’s
measurement of a time bin i, is washed away by the
beginning of the next time bin i+ 1.
In addition, we introduce the following notions for later
convenience.
(d) Detections, multi-particle emissions and
dark counts: Except with probability δ, there are
at least nthr detections, at most nmulti time bins
where multiple particles are emitted, and at most
ndark time bins where dark counts occur.
The statement of condition (a) requires some explana-
tion, which we give now. Let HA be the Hilbert space
describing radiated particles in the vicinity of detector
D. Also, let HE be that describing all degree of freedom
of Eve (cf. Fig. 2). We assume that in HA the parity
(space inversion) operator PA is well defined and satisfies
P 2A = 1. (Throughout the paper, we use the convention
of omitting the identity operators included in a tensor
product; hence e.g. PA is an abbreviation of PA ⊗ 1E .)
Under this setup, we say that the joint state ρAE(t) of
HA and HE at time t is parity invariant, if it satisfies
PAρAE(t)PA = ρAE(t). (1)
Condition (a) says that the parity invariance (1) holds at
the beginning of each time bin, i.e. at t = 0,∆t, . . . , (N−
1)∆t.
2. Feasibility of the conditions
Next we discuss the feasibility of the conditions above.
First, condition (a) can basically be satisfied by choos-
ing a nuclide which decays by parity-conserving interac-
tions (e.g. strong and electromagnetic interactions, as in
the α- and the γ-decays), since such sources will always
emit radiations with a constant parity eigenvalue.
However, as we deal here with an RNG, we must be
aware of one scenario where such choice may not be suffi-
cient for guaranteeing condition (a). That is, the nuclide
could have been tampered with by Eve, before purchased
by Alice (cf. the second and seventh paragraphs of Sec-
tion I), to the extent of destroying the parity invariance.
We point out that, even in such scenario, Alice can still
verify condition (a) by performing a test on the source
at hand, prior to executing the radioactive RNG. E.g.,
she measures the radiation from the source and checks
if the results, such as the energy spectrum and the an-
gular distribution, are always consistent with condition
(a). If this verification succeeds she then executes the
radioactive RNG; otherwise she aborts.
Second, condition (b) can always be verified visually.
Third, condition (c) is a pure assumption. However,
this assumption is in fact implicit in most literature of
quantum key distribution and physical random number
generators (including the single photon RNG mentioned
in Introduction).
Finally, condition (d) can be verified by statistically
estimating parameters nthr, nmulti and ndark with a sig-
nificant level δ, prior to executing the radioactive RNG.
C. Security of measurement result ~i
Under these conditions, the security of measurement
result ~i can be guaranteed as follows.
Theorem 1 The smooth min-entropy Hδmin(
~I|E) of ~i,
conditioned on Eve’s degree of freedom E, is bounded as
Hδmin(~I|E) ≥ nthr − nmulti − 2ndark. (2)
This means that the final bits ~r are secure, if Alice
chooses its length nfin to be roughly equal to nthr −
nmulti − 2ndark (see Lemma 2 of Section IV A for a more
rigorous interpretation of the bound (2)).
III. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In order to simplify the analysis, we use the virtual pro-
tocol approach (also known as game transform in modern
cryptography). In this approach, instead of analyzing
the actual RNG directly, one modifies it and construct
a virtual RNG, as well as a quantity H ′ arising there
which lower bounds Hδmin(
~I|E). Then analyzing the vir-
tual RNG, one obtains a lower bound on H ′, which also
4Time bin 𝑖 1 2 3 4 5 6
Detection by 𝐷 yes no yes no no yes
 𝑖 = 1, 3, 6
One-to-one
Corres-
pondence
 𝑧 = 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1
FIG. 3. One-to-one correspondence between detection tim-
ings ~i = (i1, . . . , indet), and measurement results of all time
bins ~z = (z1, . . . , zN ).
lower bounds Hδmin(
~I|E) by definition. With the virtual
RNG and H ′ designed properly, this allows one to obtain
a lower bound on Hδmin(
~I|E) by a simpler analysis.
We stress that virtual RNGs will only be used for sim-
plifying the theoretical analysis, and never need to be
implemented in practice.
As the first example of such virtual RNGs, we consider
the case where Alice records the measurement result ~i in
a different format ~z = (z1, . . . , zN ) where zi = 0 (zi = 1)
indicates the absence (presence) of a detection in time
bin i (Fig. 3). In other words, Alice records measurement
results zi of all time bins i = 1, . . . , N , instead of timings
~i where a detection occurs. It is straightforward to see
that ~i and ~z are in a one-to-one correspondence, and are
thus equally unknown to Eve,
Hδmin(~I|E) = Hδmin(~Z|E). (3)
Thus to lower bound Hδmin(
~I|E), it suffices to bound
Hδmin(
~Z|E); this is an example of the quantity H ′, men-
tioned in the second paragraph of this subsection.
Next we will modify this virtual RNG outputting ~z
further, such that the parity transform PA, described in
Section II B, is related to bit flips of zi. Then we will
make use of this relation to lower bound Hδmin(
~Z|E).
A. Ideal situation
To elucidate this relation with a simplified situation,
we temporarily idealize conditions (a) and (b) as follows.
(a’) At the beginning of each time bin, the state of ra-
diations is parity invariant and consists of exactly
one particle.
(b’) Detector D is perfect (i.e., with a unit efficiency
and no dark counts) and covers exactly the entire
lower hemisphere (Fig. 4, (B)). Hence D goes off iff
one particle or more go downward.
Then we can modify our radioactive RNG further such
that bit flips of zi and PA become equivalent.
To see this, first note that detector D alone can de-
termine whether the particle went upward or downward.
Indeed, if D detected the particle (zi = 1), it means that
it went down due to (b’); and if not (zi = 0), two condi-
tions together say that it went up.
Detector
𝐷↑
Detector
𝐷↓ = 𝐷
Detector
𝐷
Idealized
RNG
(A)
Actual Radiation
RNG
Detector
𝐷↑
Detector
𝐷↓ = 𝐷
Detector
𝐷
(D)(B) (C)
= Radiation Source = Detector
Virtual RNGs
FIG. 4. Item (A) is the side view of our radioactive RNG. We
assume that D is housed within one (the lower) hemisphere
(condition (b)). Items (B), (C) and (D) are theoretical mod-
els introduced for simplifying the description of the security
proof; these three never need to be implemented in practice.
(B) is the idealized setting satisfying conditions (a’) and (b’),
where detector D alone can determine the direction, up or
down, of the particle (Section III A). Thus (C) is equivalent
to (B), the virtual RNG using two ideal detectors. Item (D)
is the the virtual RNGs corresponding to (A) (Section III B).
These results zi = 0, 1 can alternatively be obtained
by a pair of perfect detectors, D↓ and D↑, each exactly
covering the upper and the lower hemispheres (Fig. 4,
(C)). Thus we can define another virtual RNG satisfying
(3).
Virtual RNG 1: Using D↓ and D↑, Alice measures the
source in time bins i = 1, . . . , N , and records the
result as wi ∈ {↑, ↓}. She then lets zi = 0, 1 if
wi =↑, ↓.
Detectors D↑, D↓ are ‘covariant’ under PA; that is,
if we let E↑A, E
↓
A be projection operators on the upper
and the lower hemispheres corresponding to D↑, D↓, they
satisfy
PAE
↑
APA = E
↓
A. (4)
Hence PA is equivalent to the flip of arrows wi =↑, ↓, and
thus to the bit flip of zi.
Next we use this parity covariance to show that wi are
secure. Recall that ρAE before measurement is always
parity invariant (last paragraph of Section II B). Hence
each wi is the result of measuring a parity invariant state
ρAE using parity covariant projections E
↑, E↓. Thus
wi =↑, ↓ occur with an equal probability, and in addition,
the resulting (sub-normalized) states on Eve’s side are a
fixed state, irrespective of wi,
trA(E
↓
AρAE) = trA(PAE
↓
APAPAρAEPA)
= trA(E
↑
AρAE) (5)
due to properties (1) and (4). In other words, all elements
of ~w = (w1, . . . , wN ) are distributed uniformly, and Eve
5wi ↑ none ↓ both
zi = g(wi) 0 1
w˜i = h(wi) single none single both
TABLE I. Relation between variables used in the proof of the
general situation. wi are outputs from detector pair D
↓, D↑.
The output zi of the actual detector D = (D
↓) can be emu-
lated from wi; this corresponds to ignoring outputs of D
↑. w˜i
denotes how many detectors went off out of D↓ and D↑.
gains no information of it by any measurement. In terms
of the min-entropy, this means
Hδmin(
~Z|E) = Hδmin( ~W |E) = N. (6)
This completes the proof of Theorem 1 for the ideal sit-
uation.
B. General situation
We proceed to the proof of the general situation.
We again construct a virtual RNG where a correspon-
dence between bit flips of zi and PA holds. Alice again
uses a detector pair D↓, D↑, with D↓ being the actual de-
tector D D↓ = D) and D↑ being the parity transformed
image of D (Fig. 4, (D)).
As we no longer impose conditions (a’) and (b’), it is
possible that none or both of this detector pair, instead
of one, go off in a time bin. Hence each wi takes four
values, wi ∈ {↑, ↓,none,both} (Table I, 1st row).
In this case, the output zi of D(= D
↓) alone can be
emulated from wi, by ignoring outputs of D
↑ (Table I,
second row). Thus we can define a virtual RNG as,
Virtual RNG 2: Using D↓ and D↑, Alice measures the
source in time bins i = 1, . . . , N , and records the
result as wi ∈ {↑, ↓,none,both}. She then lets zi =
g(wi), using function f specified in the second row
of Table I.
whose output g(wi) satisfies
Hmin(~Z|E) = Hmin(g( ~W )|E). (7)
As in the previous subsection, we can bound the right
hand side of (7) by exploiting the relation between mea-
surement results and the parity transform PA. However,
the argument needs to be modified, as the relation is not
the same as in the ideal situation.
That is, unlike in the ideal situation, the bit flip of
zi and PA may not be equivalent in general. This is
because zi = 0, 1 may come from measurement results
wi = ‘none’ or ‘both’, whose quantum measurements are
not in general covariant under PA. On the other hand,
measurements of wi =↑ and ↓ are still covariant under
PA, by definition of D
↓, D↑.
Hence if we evaluate the min-entropy of wi in single
detection events (i.e., time bins i where wi =↑ or ↓; see
Table I, 3rd row), we have the ideal situation again, and
the security can be shown by the same reasoning as in
the previous subsection. The min-entropy thus obtained
lower bounds Hmin(g( ~W )|E) on the right hand side of
(7), since in general, the entropy of a part is not greater
than that of the total. As a result, Hmin(g( ~W )|E) is lower
bounded by the number of single detection events. (For
the rigorous proof of statements made in this paragraph,
see Section IV C.)
We can bound the number of single detection events
as follows. The number D of the detection events is no
larger than the sum of the number of the single detection
events and the ‘both’ events. The ‘both’ events can occur
if the multiparticle emission or the dark count occurs in
either detector. Then due to condition (d), the number
of single detection events can be further lower bounded
by nthr−nmulti−2ndark, except for probability δ, and we
obtain Theorem 1.
IV. METHODS
A. Definition of security and the leftover hashing
We review definition of the security of RNG, as well as
techniques to for guaranteeing it.
In Introduction, we said that the final bits ~r is se-
cure when it is distributed uniformly and unknown to
Eve. This can be formalized as follows. Given an actual
state ρ~RE , we define the corresponding ideal state to be
ρideal~RE = 2
−nfinI~R ⊗ ρE , ρE = trA(ρAE), where ~r is dis-
tributed uniformly and is completely unknown to Eve.
H~R is the Hilbert space of the memory storing ~r. How-
ever, as it is practically difficult to always guarantee this
ideal situation, it is customary to relax this notion and
say that ~r is ε-secure if
1
2
∥∥∥ρ~RE − ρideal~RE ∥∥∥1 ≤ ε, (8)
where ‖A‖1 = tr
(√
AA†
)
denotes the L1-norm of an
operator A. Intuitively, this says that the actual state
cannot be discriminated from the ideal state except with
probability ε. This notion of security using parameter ε
is often called the universally composable security [2].
In Section II A, we stated that for the final bits ~r to
be secure, it suffices that the smooth conditional min-
entropy Hδmin(
~I|E) of measurement results ~i is lower
bounded. The rigorous results corresponding to this
statement are as follows.
The conditional min-entropy Hmin(~I|E)ρ~IE of a sub-
normalized state ρ~IE is defined to be the maximum real
number λ, satisfying 2−λI~I ⊗ σE ≥ ρ~IE for a normal-
ized state σE [23, 24]. We abbreviate Hmin(~I|E)ρ~IE
as Hmin(~I|E), whenever the subscript ρ~IE is obvious
from the context. The smooth conditional min-entropy
Hδmin(
~I|E)ρ~IE is the maximum value of Hmin(ρ¯AE |E)ρ¯~IE
6of sub-normalized states ρ¯~IE that are δ-close to ρ~IE in
terms of the purified distance [24].
If Alice performs randomness extraction (step (ii) of
Section II A) using a universal2 function family [25], F ,
the security of its output ~r satisfies the following.
Lemma 1 (Leftover hashing lemma (LHL, [23]))
If function set F is universal2, and function fs ∈ F is
chosen with probability p(s),∑
s
p(s)
∥∥∥ρ~RE − ρideal~RE ∥∥∥1 ≤ 2δ + 2 12 [nfin−Hδmin(~I|E)]. (9)
By combining this lemma and Theorem 1, we can guar-
antee the security of ~r as follows.
Lemma 2 For a given security parameter ε > 0, the
final bits ~r is ε + δ-secure, if Alice uses a universal2
hash function for randomness extraction, and if its out-
put length nfin satisfies
nfin ≤ nthr − nmulti − 2ndark − 2 log2
1
ε
+ 2. (10)
Recall that nmulti and ndark depend on δ through condi-
tion (d). Hence the right hand side of (10) depends on
both ε and δ.
B. Detailed descriptions of Radioactive RNG and
Virtual RNG 2
We here give a detailed mathematical description of
Radioactive RNG and Virtual RNG 2. We will describe
Virtual RNG 2 only, but the same description applies
also to Radioactive RNG if one neglects output of virtual
detector D↑ (cf. Table I, 1st and 2nd rows).
1. Description of the procedures of Virtual RNG 2
We will denote by D¯ the measurements setup con-
sisting of detector pair D↑, D↓. We denote four output
patterns of from D¯ in one time bin by w ∈ W, where
W := {↑, ↓,none,both} (Table I, 1st row). For the con-
venience of the security proof, we classify w by how many
of the detector pair D↑, D↓ go off in the time bin, using
symbols W˜ := {none, single,both}, where ‘single’ event
means w =↑ or ↓. A function h can be defined corre-
sponding to this classification (Table I, third row).
We continue to describe radiated particles by the
Hilbert space HA. In addition, we introduce HB to de-
scribe the radiation source.
We describe the quantum process (measurement and
time evolution) occurring inside the RNG device, during
the beginnings of adjacent time bins, by a completely
positive map MwAB : HA ⊗ HB → HA ⊗ HB . That is,
if Alice measures the state σABE(j∆t) at the beginning
of time bin j + 1 and obtains output w, the state at
the beginning of next time bin is σwABE((j + 1)∆t) =
MwAB(σABE(j∆t)).
(We here extend the convention for operators, intro-
duced above eq. (1), to maps of states, and omit the
identity operation included in a tensor product; hence
e.g. MwAB = M
w
AB ⊗ idE with idE being the identity
operation in HE .)
Hence if Alice started Virtual RNG 2 with the state
ρABE(0), and measured w1, . . . , wj in time bins 1, . . . , j,
the (sub-normalized) state at the beginning of time bin
j + 1 takes the form
ρ
(w1,...,wj)
ABE (j∆t) := M
wj
AB ◦ · · · ◦Mw1AB(ρABE(0)). (11)
When Virtual RNG 2 is finished, the joint state of
the memory that stores the entire measurement result
~w = (w1, . . . , wN ) and of Eve takes the form
ρ ~WE =
∑
~w∈WN
|~w〉 〈~w| ~W ⊗ ρ~wE , (12)
ρ~wE = ρ
(w1,...,wN )
E = trAB
(
ρ
(w1,...,wN )
ABE (N∆t)
)
(13)
2. Parity invariance of the measurement result wi
In this setting, we can argue that ρ~wE are invariant un-
der flips of arrows ↑ and ↓ included in wi, by essentially
the same argument as in Eq. (5).
To see this, first note that condition (a) asserts that
P˜A(ρ
(w1,...,wj)
ABE (j∆t)) = ρ
(w1,...,wj)
ABE (j∆t). (14)
Also note that the following relation holds for maps
M↑AB and M
↓
AB ,
M↑AB ◦ P˜A = M↓AB , (15)
where P˜A(ρA) := PAρABEPA. Eq. (15) holds for the
following two reasons: i) Due to the construction of D¯,
obtaining the measurement result ↓ is equivalent to first
applying the parity transform and then obtaining ↑. ii)
Due to condition (c), the effect caused on radiations by
the measurement of a time bin i (which may depend on
results wi =↓, ↑) is washed away before the measurement
of the next time bin i+ 1 starts.
From relations (14), (15), we see that the (sub-
normalized) state at the beginning of time bin j + 1 sat-
isfies
ρ
(w1,...,wj−1,↓)
ABE (j∆t)
=M↓AB(ρ
(w1,...,wj−1)
ABE ((j − 1)∆t))
=M↑AB ◦ PA(ρ(w1,...,wj−1)ABE ((j − 1)∆t))
=M↑AB(ρ
(w1,...,wj−1)
ABE ((j − 1)∆t))
=ρ
(w1,...,wj−1,↑)
ABE (j∆t).
(16)
7Further, combining this with eq. (11), we see that ρ~wE are
invariant under flips of arrows ↑ and ↓ included in wi. Or
in terms of classification W˜ = {none, single,both}
ρ~wE = ρ
~w′
E if h(~w) = h(~w
′), (17)
where h(~w) := (h(w1), . . . , h(wN )). That is, ρ
~w
E , ρ
~w′
E are
equal, if it holds for all time bin i that the number of
detectors that went off in time bin i is equal, h(wi) =
h(w′i) ∈ W˜.
C. Supplement to the proof of Theorem 1
In the second paragraph from the last of Section III B,
we argued that the right hand side of (7) is lower bounded
by the number of single detection events. The argument
made there was in fact rather intuitive and not suffi-
ciently rigorous. Below we give a rigorous proof.
Under these settings, we consider the following virtual
RNG. This corresponds to the situation where Alice in-
tentionally reveals h(~w) to Eve.
Virtual RNG 3: After executing Virtual RNG 2, Alice
tells Eve h(~w).
The min-entropy corresponding to this case lower bounds
the right hand side of (7), since Eve’s ambiguity never
increases on receiving an extra information h(~w).
Hmin(g( ~W )|E) ≥ Hmin(g( ~W )|h( ~W ), E). (18)
After Virtual RNG 3, Alice and Eve both know the clas-
sical random variable ~˜w = h(~w), so the overall state be-
comes a classical ensemble of those labeled by ~˜w. Thus
it suffices to analyze each ~˜w separately. To rephrase this
rigorously, due to Lemma 3.1.8 of Ref. [23],
Hmin(g( ~W )|h( ~W ), E) ≥ min
~˜w
Hmin(g( ~W )|h( ~W ) = ~˜w,E),
(19)
where the minimum is evaluated for all values of ~˜w possi-
ble, i.e., all ~˜w ∈ W˜N satisfying Pr(h(~w) = ~˜w | ρ ~WE) > 0.
Hmin(g( ~W )|h( ~W ) = ~˜w,E) on the right hand side of
(19) measures the fraction of g(~w) unknown to Eve, under
the restriction that ~w takes values satisfying h(~w) = ~˜w.
As can easily be seen by definition of functions g and
h in Table I, under this restriction, function g becomes
one-to-one, and thus the minimum entropies of g(~w) and
~w are equal,
Hmin(g( ~W )|h( ~W ) = ~˜w,E) = Hmin( ~W |h( ~W ) = ~˜w,E).
(20)
The right hand side of (20) can be evaluated using the
parity symmetry (17). Let s( ~˜w) be the number of ‘single’
symbols included in ~˜w (i.e., the number of single events),
then there are 2s(
~˜w) values of ~w satisfying h(~w) = ~˜w.
Because of (17), Eve’s (sub-normalized) states ρ
~˜w
E are
equal for all these values of ~˜w, and thus the corresponding
entropy takes the value
Hmin( ~W |h( ~W ) = ~˜w,E) = s( ~˜w). (21)
Finally, combining eqs. (18), (19), (20), and (21) to-
gether, we obtain
Hmin(g( ~W )|E) ≥ min
~˜w
s( ~˜w). (22)
D. Equivalence of the ideal situation and the single
photon RNG
If we restrict ourselves with the ideal situation of Sec-
tion III A, we can also show the security of our radioac-
tive RNG by using the argument of complementary bases,
which was mentioned in the eighth paragraph of Section
I to show the security of single photon RNGs. To see
this, let EA := E
↑
A − E↓A. Then because E2A = P 2A = IA,
Jordan lemma can be applied to EA and PA. Further,
due to condition (4), we can decompose the Hilbert space
HA as HA = HA1 ⊗HA2 such that
EA = σ
z
A1 ⊗ IA2 , PA = σxA1 ⊗ IA2 , (23)
where σz, σx are the Pauli matrices. Hence measure-
ments of radiation directions wi and of parity becomes
mathematically equivalent to those of + and× bases used
in the single photon RNG. And one can prove the secu-
rity of wi by using the same argument as in the seventh
paragraph of Introduction.
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